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Job Satisfaction as a Uniﬁed Mechanism for Agent
Behaviour on a Labour Market with Referral Hiring
Abstract—Existing agent-based labour-market models include
a very simplistic mechanism of choosing vacancies. This paper
proposes to use job satisfaction as a uniﬁed mechanism for
deciding on both starting to work on a particular job and
quitting the current job. An enhanced job satisfaction mechanism
consisting of monetary, social, content, and career components
is proposed. As an illustrative context, a labour-market model
with referral hiring and informal job search through own social
networks is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of social networks on the labour market was
repeatedly shown both empirically and theoretically. Social
networks affect the actions of both ﬁrms and individuals at
different stages of the employment process.
Firms frequently use the social networks of their employees
in the process of referral hiring. Research shows that in differ-
ent countries, 30 to 50 per cent of companies hire by employee
referral [1], [2], but it is far more common in small and
medium ﬁrms, while large ﬁrms tend to rely on formal hiring
practices [2], [3]. Different theoretical explanations of the
rationale behind using referral hiring were proposed, and all of
them are connected to reducing the costs of hiring [4]. Firstly,
the referrals of existing employees, which are a trusted source
of information for their employer, help reduce the problem
of bilateral asymmetric information and the associated costs.
Secondly, asking employees for job candidates they would
recommend is a much less costly way of ﬁnding workforce
than going through formal channels.
For individuals, social networks are even more important.
Studies show that between 30 and 50 per cent of individuals
found their new jobs through friends and relatives [5], [6], and
individuals with access to larger social networks use informal
job search channels more often [7]. Moreover, social support
from co-workers and managers, along with other factors, is
an important component of job satisfaction [8]–[12]. The Job
Demands-Resources model [13] notes that social support acts
as a buffer against high job demands, thus, preventing job
strain; it also improves employees’ motivation and productiv-
ity. Low job satisfaction is a strong indicator of a decision to
quit [14].
Job satisfaction (JS) is a multi-faceted construct. A signiﬁ-
cant body of research exists studying the factors important for
JS. There is general agreement that, besides social support, an
important role is played by intrinsic job attributes, ﬁnancial
rewards, career growth, job security, and working conditions
[15]–[18].
Referral hiring and job search through social networks were
modelled both mathematically [19]–[21] and through simu-
lations [22]–[25]. A common deﬁciency of these models is
simplistic modelling of the choice among available vacancies,
where the unemployed either take any vacancy or choose the
best vacancy only based on the proposed wage.
In [26], a mechanism for including JS in agent-based
simulations was proposed for more comprehensive modelling
of individual dynamics on the labour market. There, JS was
used both to choose the most appealing vacancy and to decide
about on-the-job search. JS depended on relative wage and
social network component.
In this paper, I take the idea of [26] further and propose to
include other important facets of job satisfaction: job content
and career opportunities. This mechanism is then integrated
into a labour-market model with referral hiring and job search
through social networks. I then study how introducing the JS
mechanism changes the dynamics on the labour market.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section
describes the job satisfaction mechanism in detail. Section III
sets up the labour-market model. Then Sect. IV discusses
how parameters should be set up, taking into account existing
empirical data. Results are discussed in Sect. V. The last
section concludes.
II. JOB SATISFACTION MECHANISM
As in [26], I divide JS in two components: expected JS,
seijf , and actual (or current, as called in [26]) JS, saijf . Bothare deﬁned for agent i relative to job j at ﬁrm f . In other
words, I introduce the dependence of JS on the ﬁrm, whereby
there is certain correlation in JS for jobs inside a ﬁrm. This
reﬂects the perception that some companies are in general
better employers than others.
As in real life, JS is modelled as a multi-faceted concept.
It consisted of wages and social support (mainly from co-
workers) in [26]. This does cover compensation and sup-
port facets, but does not take into account job content and
career opportunities. Including these latter facets introduces
substantial difﬁculties. The former two facets can be modelled
objectively (with their relative importance depending on some
agent-speciﬁc weight), in the sense that the agent can be
absolutely sure about the wage it will receive and the number
of friends (approximating social support) it will have on a con-
crete job. In contrast, job content and career opportunities are
vague concepts, more related to perceptions rather than to hard
data. Nowadays, nearly every job advertisement speaks about
an “interesting” job with “ample” career opportunities, which
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individuals have to interpret in the context of their existing
knowledge about the ﬁrm and the job under consideration.
To make the matters simple, I assume that there are two
types of jobs. The ﬁrst type has ample career opportuni-
ties and high variety (which approximates content), while
the second has limited career opportunities and low variety.
The former jobs can be represented (and will be calibrated)
by non-manual jobs (International Standard Classiﬁcation of
Occupations (ISCO) major groups 1 (managers) through 5
(service workers)), while the latter by manual jobs (ISCO
major groups 6 (skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers)
through 9 (elementary occupations)).
While agents perceive, e.g., manual jobs as having limited
career opportunities, the perception of career opportunities for
a given vacancy for such job depends also on the ﬁrm that
posted it. Again, I assume that the only characteristic of the
ﬁrm important for the perception of both career opportunities
and variety at a given vacancy is the size of the ﬁrm.1
Thus, the perception of job content and career opportunities
depend on the type of job (manual vs. non-manual) and ﬁrm
size.
Hence, expected JS is a function of:2
• Monetary compensation deﬁned as the ratio of the ex-
pected wage of agent i on job j in ﬁrm f to its reservation
wage, wijf/wri
• Social support deﬁned as the ratio of the number of
friends of agent i in ﬁrm f (which I will refer to as
“local friends”) to the total number of its friends (i.e.,
the share of its friends working in ﬁrm f ), nfi /ni
• Job variety deﬁned as a function of the type of job and
ﬁrm size, v{T (j), S(f)}
• Career opportunities deﬁned as a function of the type of
job and ﬁrm size, c{T (j), S(f)}
The functional form of expected JS is as follows:
seijf = Λ
{
6
[
wijf
wri
− 1
]}
+
[
2Λ
{
6nfi
ni
}
− 1
]
+ v{T (j), S(f)}+ c{T (j), S(f)} ,
(1)
where Λ{·} is the logistic function, whose range is [0, 1]. The
logistic function makes JS increase with monetary compensa-
tion and social support, but the return to these factors in terms
of JS is decreasing (any next dollar or local friend increases JS
less). Importantly, it also bounds the range of JS. The factor
of 6 appears because Λ(6) ≈ 1 and Λ(−6) ≈ 0. Thus, the ﬁrst
summand approaches zero when wijf ≪ wri and one when
wijf = 2wri . The second summand is zero when the agent has
no local friends (nfi = 0) and approaches one when it has allfriends working with ﬁrm f . Functions v[·] and c[·] also have
the range of [0, 1]; they will be deﬁned in Sec. IV. Thus, seijfcan take values in [0, 4].
1Industry might be an additional important factor, but in the current paper
it is ignored.
2In this paper, I use parentheses and braces in the deﬁnition of functions and
square brackets to group expressions. E.g., f(x+y) and f{x+y} should be
read as “function f of x+y,” while f [x+y] should be read as “f multiplied
by x+ y.”
Algorithm 1 Monthly Actions on the Labour Market
if start of year then
New population added
Persons aged over a¯ retire
end if
Non-start-up ﬁrms with zero workforce die
if start of year then
Firms select annual workforce change
Firms select wage change factor
end if
Update labour-market experience of persons
Create new ﬁrms
Firms update wages for expiring contracts
Firms change workforce and/or publish vacancies
Persons update current job satisfaction and consider starting
on-the-job search
Persons update reservation wage and apply to vacancies
Firms send acknowledgements to selected persons
Persons reply to the best acknowledgement, quit current job
if needed, and start working
Firms update failed vacancies
Actual JS represents the dynamics in the facets of expected
JS (mainly, wage and social support) and all other factors
gauged by a normally distributed random disturbance ξ:3
∆saijf (t) = ∆seijf (t) + ξ . (2)
By construction, the expected JS is always in [0, 4]. The value
of the actual JS is reset at the closest boundary of this interval
if Eq. (2) gives out-of-boundary values.
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION
There are two types of agents: persons and ﬁrms. The model
includes only the labour market; in particular, the education
market is ignored. The degree of match between the person
and the job is controlled through job requirements published
in vacancies, see the job search mechanism below.
Timing is discrete with one period representing one month.
Most actions on the labour market are done on a monthly
basis. The only exceptions are changes in population (inﬂow
of new school or university graduates) and in wages (standard
assumption about wage stickiness), which happen annually
(every 12 periods). Time-dependent variables are written as
f(t) if they change monthly or as f(τ ) if they change annually.
Every year, N new persons come to the model and N are
retired after living in the model for a¯ years (“retirement age”).
The overall view on monthly the labour-market actions of
persons and ﬁrms related to job search are summarised in
Algorithm 1. The following subsections describe its steps in
detail.
3Delta (∆) is used here as standard difference operator for time-dependent
functions, i.e., ∆f(t) ≡ f(t)− f(t− 1).
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A. Job Search
There is a unique vacancy list in the market, which everyone
is able to access (e.g., a country-wide job search website).
Firms post vacancies on this list and persons may browse it
to ﬁnd new jobs, which is called formal job search. Alterna-
tively, persons can choose to search for jobs informally, using
their friends that are employed. Implicitly, I assume that all
employees in a given ﬁrm are informed about all its vacancies.
A vacancy is a quadruple (f, T, x, w), where
• f is the ﬁrm hosting the vacancy
• T is the type of job (manual or non-manual)
• x ∈ Z, 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯ is the minimum required working ex-
perience measured in years; x¯ is the sufﬁcient experience,
which is common for all vacancies
• w ∈ Z, w ≤ wm is the proposed wage rate at the
required experience x; wm is the minimum wage, which
is common for all vacancies
Between the minimum required experience and the sufﬁcient
experience, wage changes linearly with experience xi:
w(xi) =
{
w[1 + q(T )[xi − x]], if x ≤ xi ≤ x¯
w[1 + q(T )[x¯− x]], if xi > x¯ , (3)
where q(T ) is a constant speciﬁc for each job type.
Every person i knows its actual experience xi and reser-
vation wage wri and, for each vacancy, is able to ﬁnd
out the wage it will be paid. The person decides prob-
abilistically on formal vs. informal search. In both cases,
the person creates a list of matching vacancies (i.e., set
{v|x(v) ≤ xi ∧ w(v, xi) ≥ wri }).4 As information processing
capabilities of agents are limited, they consider only not more
than K matching vacancies—randomly in case of formal
search and the ﬁrst ones it found in case of informal search.
It then sorts this list by descending expected JS and sends
application to top k vacancies. Both k and K are the same for
all persons.
Small (less than 25 employees) and medium-sized (25–499
employees) ﬁrms employ the referral hiring mechanism when
choosing candidates to employ. If in the list of applications for
the vacancy, there are candidates having friends employed in
the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm chooses randomly from these candidates;
otherwise, it chooses randomly from all candidates. Large
(500+ employees) ﬁrms do not look on the existing social
ties of candidates with their employees and choose randomly
from all applicants.
Successful candidates receive acknowledgements. If a per-
son receives acknowledgements from several applications, it
chooses the job with the highest expected JS. It then starts
working immediately on that job.
The vacancy may fail to attract applications if it has low
expected JS. For a given person, the ﬁrm can increase the
expected JS of the vacancy only by increasing the proposed
wage, as other components—social support, job variety, and
4See below on the additional restrictions on the vacancies in this list for
persons engaged in on-the-job search.
career opportunity—are ﬁxed. At the same time, the ﬁrm
cannot decrease the required experience to attract additional
candidates, as it needs qualiﬁed employees. The ﬁrm then
looks at the average wage for experience x and type of job T
on the market. If it is above the wage proposed by the ﬁrm,
it sets the new wage at market average. If the ﬁrm’s proposal,
w, was already higher than market average, the new proposal
is set at νw, ν > 1. If the ﬁrm still fails to hire anyone for
this vacancy in the next month, it cancels the vacancy.
Reservation wage for a working person is equal to its current
wage. For a person with no working experience, it is given by
the minimum wage. For an unemployed, it decreases with the
length of unemployment measured in months, starting from
the last wage, but is bounded from below by the minimum
wage. The decreases occurs with constant elasticity φ, which
is the same for all persons. Thus, the longer the person is
unemployed, the lower wage it is ready to accept.
If for an employed person, its current JS falls below the
minimum level, which is the same for all persons5, it starts on-
the-job search. In contrast with the unemployed, who consider
all matching vacancies, the employed consider only those
matching vacancies with the expected JS being higher than
their current JS. If accepted for a vacancy, such person quits
the current job and immediately starts working on the new
position.
B. Dynamics Inside Firms
In the ﬁrst month of the calendar year, ﬁrms plan changes
in workforce and wages. Then, every month in that year, they
implement these decisions.
If ﬁrms decide to change workforce by δ per cent this year,
they implement it by changing workforce every month by δ/12
per cent (rounded up or down as required). If the ﬁrm decides
to expand this year, it publishes the according amount of new
vacancies every month throughout the year and also publishes
all vacancies substituting the employees who left after on-the-
job search.
Each vacancy for a new position is created with the required
experience x uniformly chosen from [0, x¯], where x¯ denotes
sufﬁcient experience, and with probabilistically chosen type
of job (manual vs. non-manual). The corresponding proposed
wage w is set to the average wage of the ﬁrm’s employees with
that experience and job type. If no such persons are currently
employed in the ﬁrm, it makes interpolation from the average
wage it pays employees with the experience nearest to x and
same job type. For companies having no employees of this
job type, they take average current wages at experience x and
the selected type of job in the economy.6
5Individuals start thinking about quitting the job when they feel that their
job is “unsatisfactory.” What different individuals mean by this is reﬂected by
the combinations of the values of JS facets, but all these combinations lead
to JS falling below certain boundary. Using a relative, rather than absolute,
measure of JS, it seems realistic to assume that this boundary is the same for
everyone.
6If there are no such persons in the economy, average wages are interpolated
from employees of the same job type with nearest experience.
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Firms also publish vacancies to substitute employees who
just quit the ﬁrm either after reaching the retirement age or
due to low JS (contracted workforce is not substituted). In this
case, the experience is set below that of the worker who quit
(but still keeping it in [0, x¯]):
x = max(min(x′, x¯)− 2, 0) , (4)
where x′ is the experience of the worker who quit, and the
type of job is left the same. The wage is set as described
above.
If the ﬁrm decides to contract this year, its behaviour
is slightly different. Every month, the ﬁrm has to lay off
a certain number of employees. Before actually laying off
agents, it looks on how many employees left the company in
the previous month and ﬁrst tries to implement the change
in workforce by not publishing substituting vacancies. For
instance, if the ﬁrm has to contract by 5 employees but 3
employees left it in the previous month, the ﬁrm does not
publish these 3 substituting vacancies and lays off only 2
employees. All lay-offs are made randomly.
Every ﬁrm changes wages once a year, in accordance
with standard economic results on the stickiness of wages.
Wages are changed for all jobs in the ﬁrm by the same
factor. That factor is chosen from the set {wd, 1, wu}, where
wd < 1 and wu > 1 with the corresponding probabilities
{πu, 1− πu − πd, πd}. For a given employee, the wage is
changed in the month it was hired on the current job (if it
occurred in month 3 last year, it is changed in month 3 this
year, although the decision to change wages was made in
the beginning of this year). In other words, I assume yearly
contracts with ﬁxed wages.
C. The Birth and Death of Firms
A new ﬁrm can be born when a person probabilistically
decides to create one. This probabilistic event occurs monthly,
for both employed and unemployed persons. The mechanism
of vacancy publication for new ﬁrms is the same as for any
other ﬁrms. The only difference is that if a start-up is given
∆ts periods to ﬁnd ﬁrst employees. It allows new ﬁrms to
search for workforce for more than one period, as otherwise,
any new ﬁrm not having found at least one employee in the
ﬁrst month of its life would die (see the following paragraph).
In other words, new ﬁrms are allowed to exist for their ﬁrst
∆ts periods with zero workforce.
Otherwise, ﬁrms disappear when they are left with no work-
force. Their owners become unemployed and start searching
for a new job. When a ﬁrm’s owner is removed from the
simulation, the ﬁrm continues to exist without an owner: no
other person is assigned as a new owner.
I assume that such entrepreneurs are not subject to on-
the-job search or quitting their companies, which makes the
deﬁnition of their wages and, more broadly, JS unnecessary.
Initially, the simulation is ﬁlled with M ﬁrms with no
workforce.
D. Dynamics of Social Networks
Some of the persons that enter the model in the same
period are interconnected, forming an initial social network of,
e.g., secondary school or university friends7. They also have
friendship ties with those persons already in the labour market
(irrespective of whether they are employed or not), forming a
mature social network. These two sets of connections form
the social network with which the person enters the model.
This initial social network is generated using the Dupli-
cation model [27, Ch. 4] parametrised to build a scale-free
social network, having many low-degree vertices and a few
high-degree vertices.8 Empirical research indicates that such
networks approximate the real-world social networks quite
well [28]–[30]. Both networks are built separately with the
same parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1).
When person i, having a social network of ni friends,
ﬁrst comes to a new job, it tries to make new friendship
ties with ⌈ni/10⌉ persons working in that ﬁrm; each tie is
created with probability 1/2, as the other party can refuse
the proposed friendship. The principle of homophily says that
people make friendship ties from those close to them by
some characteristics [31]. In accordance with it, persons make
friends only with those working in the same job type as theirs.
As the person cannot have an indeﬁnite number of friends, it
substitutes the existing friends with these new friends. So if on
the ﬁrst working day, the person makes k new connections, it
breaks connections with k its existing friends, ﬁrstly removing
those with the longest period of unemployment.
IV. PARAMETRISATION
European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5 [32] has individual-
level data on the perceptions of the employed in 24 European
countries9 in 2010–11 about their jobs. I use pooled data
from these countries for setting parameter values. Tables I
and II show the details. Note that, as assumed in this paper,
the perceptions of both career opportunities and variety in
work are better in non-manual occupations than in manual
occupations. Functions v[·] and c[·] are deﬁned according to
this table. There are, thus, three categories of ﬁrm size, S(f):
small (under 25 employees), medium (25 to 499 employees),
and large (at least 500 employees).
Wage dynamics is set based on estimates available in the
literature, see Table III. The average effect on wages from
labour-market experience is around 2.5%. Estimates based on
US data show that it is around 1.5 times larger for the tertiary-
educated than for the secondary-educated. Assuming that the
7Friends in the broad sense, meaning both close friends and acquaintances
8In short, the Duplication model proceeds in two-step iterations. At the
ﬁrst step, a new vertex is added to the graph and connected randomly with an
existing vertex. At the second step, the algorithm goes over each neighbour of
the existing vertex and connects it to the new vertex with probability ρ. Thus,
ρ is the probability of an agent creating a connection with a friend of its new
friend. It was shown [27, 78] that the model generates scale-free networks
with the exponent β that is a solution to the equation 1 + ρ = ρβ + ρβ−1.
9Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK.
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TABLE I
SHARE OF EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS BELIEVING THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT ARE GOOD
Firm Size (# employees)
< 25 25–499 500+
Extent of Agreeing
(Fully disagree 1..5 Fully agree) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Non-manual occupations 11% 27% 29% 27% 6% 9% 27% 29% 30% 5% 9% 23% 27% 33% 7%
Manual occupations 17% 30% 27% 22% 4% 17% 33% 25% 21% 3% 15% 33% 24% 24% 4%
Source: calculated from European Social Survey Round 5 pooled data from 24 European countries (see Footnote 9).
TABLE II
SHARE OF EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS BELIEVING THAT VARIETY IN WORK IS GOOD
Firm Size (# employees)
< 25 25–499 500+
Extent of Agreeing
(Fully disagree 1..4 Fully agree) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Non-manual occupations 7% 26% 34% 34% 5% 20% 35% 40% 4% 18% 34% 45%
Manual occupations 17% 31% 28% 24% 17% 31% 30% 23% 18% 27% 30% 25%
Source: calculated from European Social Survey Round 5 pooled data from 24 European countries (see Footnote 9).
TABLE III
EMPIRICAL DATA ON WAGE RETURNS ON YEAR OF EXPERIENCE
Author Country Sex Education Level
Secondary Tertiary Total
[33] Italy Men 2.9%Women 1.1%
[34] UK Men 2.2%
[35] UK All 7.4%
[36] 9 countries All 1.06%–3.67%
[37] USA Men 1.8% 2.5%Women 1.9% 3.2%
[38] USA Men 3.1% 5.8%Women 3.7% 8.2%
Estimates correcting for unobserved heterogeneity were taken where available.
Where cumulative effect of experience over several years was given, it was
converted into annual effect assuming that the effect from every additional
year of experience is the same (e.g., a 20% cumulative effect over 10 years
would be converted into a 2% annual effect). From [36], data were taken
only on countries with positive relationship between wage and experience; the
nine countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, and the UK.
former work at non-manual jobs and the latter at manual
jobs10, I set the wage-experience coefﬁcient at 3.0% for non-
manual jobs and at 2.0% for manual jobs. The relationship
between wage and experience is non-linear: returns are di-
minishing at higher experience levels and after 20–30 [36]
years, the wage-experience curve ﬂattens11. Here, I assume
that wage changes linearly with experience (recall Eq. (3)) and
wage stops depending on experience starting with 20 years of
experience, which I call “sufﬁcient” experience level.
10In other words, I assume there is no over- or under-education and the
education levels of all workers perfectly matches job demands.
11In some countries, wages start dropping afterwards.
The distribution of annual workforce change is set in
accordance with Amadeus data for European companies in
2010–2013, see Table III. Note that extreme changes (larger
than 50 per cent in absolute terms) were ﬁltered out from the
sample and are also not allowed in the simulation. In around
70 per cent of cases, ﬁrms will change workforce by ±10 per
cent.
According to the job-search theory [39], reservation wage
falls with unemployment spell duration. Empirical studies used
constant-elasticity models for quantifying this effect, but came
to substantially different elasticities, ranging from −10% [40]
to −80% [41]. I set the elasticity at −20%, which means
that for every 10 per cent increase in unemployment spell,
reservation wage falls 2 per cent.
The probability of becoming entrepreneur is set based on
the share of self-employed in Europe (ESS Round 5 data),
which is12 13%, and Proposition A.1.
The Duplication model parameter ρ is set so that the model
generates a scale-free network with exponent β ≈ 2.61, which
is inside the range [2, 3] typical for social networks [27]. The
number of direct connections in initial and mature networks
are set so that the average number of friends would be not
more than 100–120, the maximum number of Facebook friends
with which an individual interacted at least once [30, Fig. 15].
V. RESULTS
The model was implemented in Repast Simphony. At this
moment, only preliminary results are available.
The initial number of ﬁrms is a major factor affecting the
overall employment in all further periods. With M = 10, un-
employment exceeded 95 per cent for the length of simulation,
while with M = 50, there was nearly full employment on
12Share of self-employed from the employed in paid work, in education,
unemployed and inactive. Not taking into account the disabled, retired, in
military service or doing housework.
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL WORKFORCE PERCENTAGE CHANGE
% Change [−50,−41] [−40,−31] [−30,−21] [−20,−11] [−10,−1] [0, 9] [10, 19] [20, 29] [30, 39] [40,50]
% in Sample 0.7 1.0 2.4 7.0 25.3 45.2 10.4 4.4 2.1 1.5
Data from Amadeus, accumulated over 2010–2013. The sample contains active ﬁrms operating in EU-28, Norway and Switzerland. Only ﬁrms with annual
change in workforce in the interval of [−50%,+50%] were selected. The distributions in each individual year in the 2010–2013 interval are very similar to
that given in the table.
TABLE V
PARAMETER VALUES
Parameter Name Notation Value
General
Annual inﬂow of new persons N 100
Retirement age, years a¯ 30
Length of simulation, years 100
Initial number of ﬁrms M 50
Job Satisfaction
Current job satisfaction disturbance
mean µ(ξ) 0
std.dev. σ(ξ) 0.1
Critical job satisfaction for on-the-job search 20%
Workforce Dynamics
Prob. of manual vacancy 0.30
Wage multiplier when updating vacancy ν 1.05
Wage-experience multiplier q
manual jobs 2%
non-manual jobs 3%
Sufﬁcient experience, years x¯ 20
Job Search
# of simultaneous applications k 5
Max # of vacancies considered K 50
Prob. of formal job search 0.3
Unempl. length elasticity of reservation wage φ −20%
Wage Speciﬁcation
Minimum wage wm 100
Wage dynamics
Prob. of increasing wage πu 0.6
Factor of wage increase wu 1.05
Prob. of decreasing wage πd 0.1
Factor of wage decrease wd 0.95
Entrepreneurship
Prob. of becoming entrepreneur 0.95%
How long considered start-up, periods ∆ts 6
Social Networks
Duplication model parameter ρ 0.45
Number of direct connections
initial social network 30
mature social network 10
the labour market. Further sensitivity analysis will reveal the
dependence of unemployment on the initial number of ﬁrms.
Next I compare the model with full JS and the model with
JS consisting only of the wage component. In other words,
the latter model resembles typical economic models, where
all decisions are based on proposed wages.
Both models lead to the creation of large ﬁrms (less than 5
per cent of all ﬁrms) an medium ﬁrms (20 to 30 per cent of all
ﬁrms), see Fig. 1. Over time, the proportion of medium ﬁrms
increases at the expense of small ﬁrms in the model with full
JS, but drops in the model where decisions depend on wages
only. Further analysis is needed to check for model stability.
The share of employees on manual jobs from all employed
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Fig. 1. Share of Firms of Different Size
Note: The size category of the ﬁrm (small, medium or large) is deﬁned as in
Sect. IV.
is nearly twice higher in the model with full JS than in the
model with wage component (23 per cent vs. 13 per cent on
average in the last period of the run). By construction, wages
grow faster for non-manual jobs. Clearly, in the model with full
JS, this is dampened by other factors, but when only wage is
important, agents are still more inclined to choose non-manual
jobs.
In the update to this version of the paper, I will add the
results on the existence of social clustering in ﬁrms in both
models, as well as comparing the base model with a model
where persons use only formal search.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX
Proposition A.1. Let P be the observed share of en-
trepreneurs in the population and p be the probability of
becoming entrepreneur at any time moment in the model
(constant over time). Assume that once the person becomes
an entrepreneur, it cannot revert its status at any later time
and that all age groups are equally represented in the model
population. Let a¯ be the maximum age of a person in the
population (measured in years). Then the relationship between
p and P is as follows:
P = 1 + 1− (1− p)
a¯
a¯ ln (1− p) . (5)
Proof: Consider a random person. After living a periods
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in the model, the probability of being entrepreneur is
π(a) =
a∑
k=0
(1− p)k−1p (6)
= p[1− (1− p)
k]
1− (1− p) (7)
= 1− (1− p)k . (8)
To translate it to the whole population, ﬁrst divide the
interval of age, [0, a¯], into subintervals of length ∆a. As the
function π(a) is smooth, for small enough ∆a we can assume
that π(·) is constant in any point inside such subinterval. Then
the probability of a random person in the population to be
entrepreneur is given by the sum over age subintervals of
the products of the probability of falling into a particular
age subinterval and the probability of being entrepreneur
inside this interval. By assumption, the former probability is
constant and given by a¯/∆a. Then the probability of observing
entrepreneur is
π =
a¯/∆a−1∑
k=0
π(k∆a)∆aa¯ (9)
=
a¯/∆a−1∑
k=0
(
1− (1− p)k∆a
) ∆a
a¯ (10)
= a¯∆a
∆a
a¯ −
1−
(
(1− p)∆a
) a¯
∆a
1− (1− p)∆a
∆a
a¯ (11)
= 1− 1− (1− p)
a¯
1− (1− p)∆a
∆a
a¯ . (12)
Finally, take this expression to the limit of ∆a (note the use
of l’Hoˆpital’s rule):
lim
∆a→0
π = 1− lim
∆a→0
1− (1− p)a¯
1− (1− p)∆a
∆a
a¯ (13)
= 1− lim
∆a→0
1− (1− p)a¯
−a¯(1− p)∆a ln (1− p) (14)
= 1 + 1− (1− p)
a¯
a¯ ln (1− p) . (15)
This should be equal to P .
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